Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Articles and Research

Science and Technology Faculty Articles and
Research

9-20-2021

Review of "James Lindley Wilson: Democratic Equality. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2019, Pp. 307.)"
John Thrasher

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_articles

Review of "James Lindley Wilson: Democratic Equality. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2019, Pp. 307.)"
Comments
This review was originally published in The Review of Politics in 2021. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0034670521000528

Copyright
The author. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of University of Notre Dame.

James Wilson: Democratic Equality. (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2019, Pp. 307).

Democracy is widely considered the most or perhaps the only legitimate form of
government, though its precise justification is a matter of dispute. Two main lines of
justification are that democracy is justified by the goods it reliably produces (instrumental)
or because of it embodies respect, autonomy, public justification, equality or some other
moral value or principle (intrinsic). Several recent influential accounts of the justification
of democratic authority attempt to merge the two approaches by arguing that democracy
can derive both its form and its point from a conception of equality. Democratic authority
is justified because only democracy embodies equality of status and authority. Democracy
is understood as a distinctively egalitarian form of government, while equality is
understood along democratic lines.
James Wilson’s Democratic Equality is not so much a defense of this justificatory strategy
as it is a detailed working out of a specific version of it and its implications. Wilson’s goal
is to explicate a conception of political equality that is essential to democracy, to show why
it is valuable, and to work out its practical, institutional implications. Democracy is good
primarily because it instantiates and supports political equality, which must also be
understood in the context of democratic life. Wilson develops a distinctive account of
equality, while also showing how a clearer understanding of political equality should
inform our evaluation of democratic norms and institutions.
In developing this conception of political equality, Wilson follows the lead of Tom
Christiano, Niko Kolodny, and Daniel Viehoff in thinking that equality should be
understood as equality of authority or status. Democracy derives its authority, on this view,
by giving everyone equal authority or power. What this amounts to or requires, however,
is a matter of dispute. Wilson argues that equal authority is properly understood as a
requirement of equal, sincere consideration of the judgements of one’s fellow citizens in
the process of democratic deliberation.
Wilson makes several claims about this conception of political equality as equal
consideration. Political equality, for instance, requires that political institutions reflect the
publicly recognized equal status of citizens. This makes political equality a strong
constraint on the types and forms of democratic institutional arrangements. Political
equality should also act as an on-going regulative democratic norm. Merely implementing
an institutional framework or decision rule that tends to distribute power equally is not
enough, democratic institutions should be “temporally sensitive.” This amounts to a
rejection of proceduralism with respect to implementing institutions meant to distribute
power equally. Further, political equality entails equal appropriate “consideration,” rather
than equal political power. This goes beyond the power to issue political commands or
directives and includes the requirement that consideration of one’s judgements be included
in public deliberation.
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The core idea of the book is that “equal political standing amounts to being in an ongoing
political relationship of equality with other citizens” (6). The defense of political equality
as an “ongoing relationship” is probably the most distinctive aspect of the approach
defended here. This relationship of equality entails that we “recognize each citizen as
equally entitled to render authoritative judgements as to how to organize and regulate all
citizens’ common life” (49). Wilson takes the idea of a relationship between citizens quite
literally, describing it as a form of “civic friendship.”
While Wilson finds the analogy between political equality and friendship to be “intuitive
and fairly obvious” (59), others may not. In any case, it is clear from the analogy that what
equal consideration requires is quite demanding. Friends must take one another’s
judgments into consideration when acting together. It is not enough for friends or citizens
to engage in sincere deliberation; to give adequate consideration means sometimes
deferring to the judgements of another even when doing so would involve something that
the others prefer not to do (58-59).
Even if we accept this account of friendship, we might question how a personal relationship
like friendship can really be extended the largely impersonal realm of democratic politics.
Nothing remotely resembling friendship would be an accurate description of the
relationship that most legislators and citizens have to one another in any existing
democracy, past or present. In a society of friends, democracy is unnecessary and,
assuming that decisions are not made by unanimous assent, friendship does not adequately
characterize the relationship between political actors. This is not exactly an objection.
Wilson is engaged in a normative project of establishing what a well-functioning
democracy would look like and what norms it would embody, the fact that no democracy
has these features is not necessarily a mark against it. Nevertheless, if the conception of
political equality that is meant to support democratic authority is so far from what we would
expect in a real democratic society, there is a sense in which we have changed the subject
and are no longer talking about what democracy and equality require.
We should take the relation between democratic theory and practice seriously is important
partly because Wilson is clear that he does. To that end, he spends Part III of the book
showing how his conception of political equality can inform contemporary political debates
about democratic norms and institutions. This part of the book is well-reasoned, and Wilson
thinks that radical reforms are mostly not necessary to bring existing democratic
institutions closer to his conception of political equality.
There is a bit of a disconnect between the account of political equality developed in Part I
and II and the discussion of how that political equality can inform democratic reform,
though, and I have already hinted at why that might be so. The book is an exercise in
political theory of the type that is neither fish nor fowl. It engages with core philosophical
concerns at the heart of democratic theory but does not follow the arguments down to their
foundations. It also engages with intuitional questions in democratic theory, but not at the
level of detail that one would expect from either the formal or empirical literature.
Whichever side of that divide you are on, you are likely to be unsatisfied by the approach
here in some way. That said, it makes sense to go the route Wilson did. The rigor of the
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philosophers and obsession with first principles can often seem pedantic and pointless,
while the more empirical approach often lacks any serious engagement with the type of
foundational issues that Wilson is rightly concerned with.
One may feel somewhat unsatisfied because it is exceptionally hard to capture all aspects
of the topic that good political theory aims at; nevertheless, everything here is well done
and will likely inform the debate on equal political authority and democracy going forward.
I have really only mentioned some of the main themes in this book, which is dense and full
of insight. It is especially important insofar as it defends a conception of political equality
based on the relational egalitarian notion of equality of status that does not cash this idea
out in terms of equality of power. Taken as a whole, Wilson presents a thoroughly worked
out conception of political equality as well as its relation to democracy and democratic
institutions.
John Thrasher
Chapman University
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